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BusINEss MANAGER.
We regret that in our July issue we printed the name of Frederick H.
Clark as the author of the article entitled "Legality of Purchase by a
Corporation of its Own Stock;" the article was really the work of Frederick H. Cooke, Esq., of the New York Bar.
NEGLIGENCE-PROXIMATE AND REMOTE CAUSE-DAMAGESINJURY TO FEELINGs-FAILURE TO DELIVER TETEGnAPH MESSAGE.-Western Union Telegraph Go. v. Ragland, 61 South
Western Rep. 421 (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, February27,

1901).-The case involves the familiar question of negligence
and the interesting consideration of the validity of a stipulation,
by a telegraph company, limiting its liability for mistakes or
delays in the transmission of messages to the amount of the toll
paid, unless the sender order his message repeated, at an extra
charge.
A message was sent which read: "To Will Rone, Commerce,
Texas: Send J. J. word pa is dead and have grave dug by my
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children. Leave space between for one grave. Have two wagons
meet train at Campbell, at 11.50 this morning. John Ragland."
When this message reached Commerce, it read: "To Will Bone,"
and the mistake caused a failure of delivery. When Ragland,
plaintiff, arrived with the corpse, he was not met by wagons,
nor was the grave dug, wherefore he was unable to inter the
remains that day, and was necessitated to hold them until the
next. Plaintiff alleges that he was obliged to walk part of the
way to his home, and took sick from exposure, which sickness
confined him to his bed for three weeks. Re sues for damages
for his sickness, for the loss of time which it entailed, and for
his mental distress occasioned by his having to keep the remains
at his house over night, after decomposition had set in. The
lower court awarded him damages, and the case arises upon
appeal by the telegraph company,-wherein the lower court is
reversed.
The general rule, as universally approved since Hadley v.
Baxendale (9 Exch.), being that plaintiff may recover for such
injuries as may fairly and reasonably be considered as arising,
according to the usual course of things, from the breach, or as
may reasonably be supposed to have been contemplated as the
probable result thereof, the defendant complains of a charge
authorizing the jury to find "for plaintiff such additional sum
(beyond the cost of the message) as will compensate him for his
loss of time, physical and mental pain and anguish suffered, if
such as may have been the proximate and direct result of the
defendant's failure to deliver such message." This complaint
the court favors. Plaintiff's sickness resulting, according to his
story, from exposure during a walk which he was forced to take
because the object of his dispatch was not obtained, through
non-delivery due to defendant's negligence, hardly bears, to
such negligence, such an intimate or proximate relation of effect
to cause as the law demands should exist to warrant damages.
The sequence is broken, and intervening, non-essential agencies
are clearly distinguishable. Loss of time resulting from failure to deliver a message, if a direct, proximate result, is generally
conceded to be an appreciable injury. But the loss of time of
which the plaintiff chiefly complains is even more remote than
his sickness, of which it is a consequence. Neither, therefore,
of these injuries is such as would be within the reasonable
anticipation of the parties as likely to ensue from a breach of
their contract.
Of defendanfs negligence there is little doubt. Testimony
was adduced to show that the company might have sent the
message over a route requiring but one relay, while the route
over which it actually was sent contained three relays, at each
of which it had to be taken from the wires and re-transmitted.
The mistake was committed at one of these relays, by an
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operator's failure to correctly read the name of the addressee,
though the telegraphic symbols for the confused letters were
quite dissimilar. Obviously, the issue of negligence was fairly
raised. The operator's act, or omission, may well be called
gross negligence. The care which he failed to exercise was of a
degree entirely ordinary, considered in the light of the duties
of his position. The negligence of which he was guilty was
sufficiently lacking in exculpatory circumstances to justify the
vituperative adjective. Such negligence cannot be contracted
against by the company's usual stipulation for non-liability in
the instance of unrepeated messages. How far that stipulation
will exonerate the telegraph companies, or be a defence in suits
on mistakes or delays in unrepeated messages is a l uestion,
and fervent language has been used on either side. It seems
to be agreed, however, that once negligence is clearly made out
the stipulation will not unburden the companies of responsibility, for more than the amount of the toll. "To permit them
to contract against their own negligence would be to arm them
with a most dangerous power, and indeed that would leave the
public almost entirely remediless:" Western Union Telegraph
Co. v. Graham, 9 Am. Rep. 136.
"If it (the stipulation) be a contract, the sender entering
into it was under a species of moral duress; his necessity compelled him to resort to the telegraph as the only means through
which he could speedily transact the business in hand, and was
compelled to submit to such conditions as the company in their
corporate greed might impose, and sign such a paper as the
company might present:" Tyler v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., 60 Ill. 421. And on page 439 of the report the Supreme
Court of Illinois declared the stipulation "unjust, unconscionable, without consideration, and utterly void." On the other
hand, the identical stipulation has been held "reasonable and
valid" by the Supreme Court of the Unitcd States, Justices
Fuller and Harlan dissenting: Primrose v. Wl"estern Union
Telegraph Co., 154 W. S. 1. In that case the court quoted with
approval parts of the opinion written by Judge Hare in Passmore v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 9 Phila. 90, in which
he upheld the right of the companies to so protect themselves.
"A railway, telegraph or other company, charged with a
duty which concerns the public interest, cannot screen themselves from liability for negligence; but they may prescribe
rules calculated to insure safety, and diminish the loss in the
event of accident, and declare that, if these are not observed,
the injured party shall be considered as in default, and precluded by the doctrine of contributory negligence. The rule
must. however, be such as that reason, which is said to be the
life of the law, can approve, or, at the least, such as it need not
condemn. By no device can a body corporate avoid liability for
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fraud, for willful wrong, or for the gross negligence which, if
it does not intend to occasion injury, is reckless of consequences,
and transcends the bounds of right with full knowledge that
mischief may ensue." This judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 78 Pa. St. 238. The stipulation
has been held void as against public policy, however, in several
states: Telegraph Co. v. Griswold, 37 Ohio St. 301. Telegraph
Co. v. Crall, 38 Kan. 679, Telegraph Co. v. Howell, 38 Kan.
685. This side of the discussion is argued trenchantly in Ayer
v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 79 Me. 443, also 21 Am. and
Eng. Corp. Cases, 145; and 1 American State Rep., 353.
"Is such a stipulation in the contract of transmission valid,
as a matter of contract assented to by the parties, or is it void
as against public policy? We think it is void. Telegraph companies are quasi-public servants. They receive from the public
valuable franchises. They owe the public care and diligence.
Their business ultimately concerns the public. Many and various
interests are practically dependent upon it. Nearly all interests
may be affected by it. Their negligence in it may often work
irreparable mischief to individuals and communities.
It is
essential for the public good that their duty of using care and
diligence be rigidly enforced. They should no more be allowed
effectually to stipulate for exemption from this duty than should
a carrier of passengers, or any other party engaged in a public
business. This rule does not make telegraph companies insurers.
It does not make them answer for errors not resulting from their
negligence. It only requires the performance of a plain duty.
It is no hardship for them. .
. Why should they make
conditions for such performance? Having taken the message
and the pay, why should they not do all things (including the
repeating) necessary for correct transmission? Why should
they insist on a special compensation for using any particular
mode or instrumentality as a guard against their own negligence? It seems clear to us, that, having undertaken the business, they ought, without qualification, to do it carefully, or be
responsble for want of care."
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in an action on the
case brought by the receiver of an erroneous message held that
"though telegraph companies are not, like carriers, insurers for
the safe delivery of what may be entrusted them,, their obligations, as far as they reach, spring from the same sources,
namely, the public nature of their employment, and the contract
under which the particular duty is assumed;" and that one of
the plainest of these obligations was to transmit the very message prescribed: N. Y. and T1. Printing Tel. Co. v. Dryburg,
35 Pa. 298. Here it will be noted that the action is brought by
the receiver of the message, to whom the condition in the blank
does not apply: Tel. Co. v. Richman, 19 W. N. C. 569 (1887).
.
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It would appear then, that the company may validly stipulate
against liability, for mistakes or delays or non-delivery, for
more than the toll paid, if these be not the consequences of its
negligence, but that for negligence the company must answer.
The rule seems fair because of the unusual nature of their business, and the peculiar possibilties of accident incident to it.
The Pennsylvania law is practically the same, only for the
change of position of rule and exception in its expression.
"Telegraph companies are responsible in damages for mistakes
in the transmission of despatches; unless the causes of failure
are beyond their control:" Brightly's Purdon's Digest, p. 2001,
and authorities there cited. From all of which the conclusion
is that the company, in the principal case, would not be screened
from liability by its condition imposed. The cause of failure
was well within its control, and failure to bring the control to
bear connates negligence. Strangely enough, the wrong is justly
irremediable in damages, because of the clear severance of it
from the plaintiff's injury, according to the criteria posited by
law. The rupture of the continuousness of events, already
noticed, defeats the plaintiff's cause of action on the ground
of sickness and loss of time. Both are recognizably consequences, but remotely. The defendant's undoubted wrong bears
to the plaintiff's alleged injury, at most the relation of a conditio
sine qua non. Efficient causality is wanting.
The other ground for plaintiff's suit, his mental suffering, is
disposed of according to the rule which has come to be followed
in Texas, after some difference of opinion. In 1881 the Supreme
Court of that state held that the sendee of a message might
recover from the company for mental suffering caused by its
failure to promptly deliver a message which announced to him
the death of his mother. The general proposition has been
repeatedly re-affirmed in that state, so that mental distress has
been recognized as redressable in damages. The case in 1881
was So. Relle v. The Telegraph Company, 55 Texas, 308. This
is, however, the only Texas ease which holds that a party may
come into court solely to redress his feelings.-and in so far as
the case held that such damage alone would sustain an action,
it was overruled in R. R. Co. v. Leiy. 59 Texas, 542.
In the Ragland case the decision was plain that, the other
causes for recovery being eliminated, the "mental anguish"
ground was invalid standing alone. Mental suffering, however,
has been allowed to form an element of actual damage: Stuart v.
W. TV. Tel. Co.. 66 Texas, 580. But such mental suffering as
may be occasioned by failure to transmit or deliver cannot be
emphasized into a ground for the recovery of punitory damages:
McAllen v. W. IV. Tel. Co., 70 Texas, 243.
fental suffering,
as incident to some actual, or physical injury, is considered a
measurable damage in many Texas cases, influenced by the So.
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Relle case. In addition to those cited, see Tel. Co. v. Cooper, 71
Texas, 567; Loper v. Tel. Co., 70 Texas, 689; Tel. Co. v. Simpson, 73 Texas, 422; Tel. Co. v. Adams, 75 Texas, 531, and the
following case, Ibid. 537, Tel. Co. v. Moore, 76 Texas, 57. The
courts of Alabama, Tennessee, Indiana and Kentucky have
relied on these Texas decisions as authority, and followed them.
And their rule of damages is enforced by the Supreme Courts
of Georgia and Virginia, even where the message is in cipher.
The language of W. W. Tel. v. Adams, 75 Texas, 531 (1889),
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states, nor in those of England. "Mental pain and anxiety the
law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone :" Lynch v. Knight,
9 H. L. Gas. 577. And examples of similar denials are legion:
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death of his brother in time to attend his burial Recovery was
denied him, the court saying: "e have given to the investigaquestion that consideration which its importance
tion of the
demands, and, though the right of the plaintiff to recover the
damages awarded in this case finds suppot in the decisins of
several of the states, we are unwilling to depart from the longestablished and almost universal rule of law that no action lies
for the recovery of damages for mere mental suffering, disconnected from physical injury, and not the result of the willful
wrong of the defendant." In Rowell v. Tel. Co., 75 Texas, 26,
the damage complained of was continued anxiety caused by failure to promptly deliver a message, and the court said: "Some
kind of unpleasant emotion in the mind of the injured party
is probably the result of a breach of contract in most cases,
but the cases are rare in which such emotion can be held an
element of the damages resulting from the breach. For injury
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to the feelings in such cases the court cannot give redress. Any
other rule would result in intolerable litigation."
The late case of Tel. Co. v. Edmonson, 91 Texas, 209, 42 S.
W. Rep. 544, refused utterly to follow the earlier Texas decisions,
holding that mental anguish, suspense and anxiety, were not
sufficiently natural results of the company's breach of contract
to warrant damages, and pronouncing the wrong damnum
absque injuria. In other states the courts are still more strict
in giving damages for injuries incapable of accurate, or at least
approximate measurement in money. Loss of credit is a more
tangible injury than mental distress, and would appear quite
susceptible of being measured in pecuniary terms. Yet it was
held in Pennsylvania that for loss of credit, unaccompanied by
pecuniary loss, a company was not liable: Smith v. Tel. Co.,
150 Pa. 561 (1893).
The same theory would probably be followed to-day in the
jurisdictions mentioned as maintaining the opposite view a
few years since. Texas itself leans that way in more recent
decisions: Tel. Co. v. Carter, 85 Texas, 580; Tel Co. v. Slites,
89 Texas, 312. And it is believed to have been properly applied
in the Ragland case. The plaintiff undoubtedly makes out a
wrong in defendant, and could he show any injury resulting to
himself as a natural and probable sequence, or such as both
parties might have contemplated as likely to result from a breach,
when their contract was formed, damages should be awarded
him. Unfortunately, the only damage he can show is too remote
to be considered by the law, or too intangible to be grasped by
practical justice, such an injury, in a word, as cannot be recompensed in damages without countenancing a rule whose consistent application is impracticable.
J. W. H.
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BAl EE.-Brewer Lumber Co.
v. Boston and A. R. Co., 60 Northeastern, 548, kSupreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, June 1, 1901).-The action in
this case was one of replevin for a carload of lumber, which had
been shipped over the defendant's railroad, the agreement between consignor and consignee being that the consignee pay the
freight. Upon its arrival the consignee was notified of the
fact, but failed to remove it within the time required by the
rules of the company. The lumber was then stored in the sheds of
the railroad company wher it remained for two months, being
held for freight and storage charges. At the end of this time,
the consignee having become bankrupt, the consignor notified
STORAGE OF GOODS-CARRIER AS
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the railroad company not to deliver the lumber, claiming to
exercise the right of stoppage in transitu. The trustee of the
bankrupt defended the action.
The court held that the transitu had not ended since the consignee had never had actual or constructive possession of the
lumber, and that therefore the right of stoppage in transitu
remained.
There was formerly some doubt as to whether a constructive
possession by the consignee was sufficient to divest this right.
The case of Newhall v. Vargas, 15 Me. 314, is authority for the
following statement: "Stoppage in transitu is a resumption by
the seller of the possession of goods not paid for, while on their
way to the vendee and before he has acquired aotual possession
of them." This definition represents the view taken by some of
the old cases. At the present time, however, the law seems
well settled that a constructive possession by the consignee is
sufficient to preclude the right. The court, therefore, was correct in saying, "It makes no difference whether the goods are
in the hands of the carrier qua carrier or whether he puts them,
at the journey's end, in a warehouse. In other words, the transit
does not terminate until the goods arrive in the possession, actual
or constructive, of the purchaser:" Seymour v. Newton, 105
Mass. 272; Mohr v. Railroad Co., 106 Mass. 67; Umber Co. v.
O'Brien, 123 Mass. 12; Inslie v. Lane, 57 N. H. 454.
In the present case there was no actual possession by the consignee. Was there then a constructive possession? To determine this it is necessary to find out the meaning of the term
"constructive possession." This appears to refer to the possession of an agent of the consignee; and there is no doubt that
upon the arrval of the goods the consignee may by contract
constitute the carrier, his agent, to receive and store them for
him. This thought is expressed by Parke, B., in Whitehead v.,
Anderson, 9 M. & W. 534, where he says, "A case of constructive possession is where the carrier enters expressly or by implication into a new agreement distinct from the original contract
for carriage to hold the goods for the consignee as his agent,
not for the purpose of expediting them to the place of original
destination pursuant to that contract, but in a new character
for the purpose of custody on his account, and subject to some
new and further order to be given by him."
In cases where the freight remains unpaid upon the arrival of the goods, the subsequent storing of them by the carrier raises no presumption that he is doing so as agent of
the consignee. On the contrary the law is well settled that the
existence of the carrier's lien for unpaid freight raises a strong
presumption that the carrier continues to hold the goods as
carrier. This is because the consignee is not entitled to the
goods until he discharges the lien of the carrier. However,
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this presumption may be rebutted by proof of an agreement
between consignee and carrier whereby the carrier agrees to
hold the goods as agent of the consignee, while at the same time
retaining his lien for freight charges by means of his possession:
Ex parte Barrow, 6 Oh. Div. 783; Ex parte Cooper, 11 Oh. Div.
68; Ex parte Falk, 14 Ch. Div. 446. In other words, it is not
necessary that the carrrier's lien should first be discharged
before it can agree to hold the goods as agent of the consignee.
Mr. Benjamin, in his book on "Sales," expresses this thought
in the following words: "The carrier's change of character into
that of an agent to keep the goods for the buyer is not at all
inconsistent with his right to retain the goods in his custody
till his lien upon them for carriage or freight charges is satisfied.
Nothing prevents an agreement by the master of a vessel or other
carrier to hold the goods, after arrival at destination, as agent
of the buyer, though he may at the same time say, 'I shall not
let you take them until my freight is paid'": "Benjamin on
Sales," 4 Am. Ed., §853; Hall v. Dimond, 63 N. H=.569; Allen
v. Gupper, 2 C. & J. 218.
This being the law, although in the present case, the consignee had never paid the freight charges, and the carrier therefore held the goods primarily by virtue of his lien, yet if an
agreement could be shown whereby the carrier had agreed to
hold the goods as agent of the consignee, the transituwould have
ended, and the consignor been precluded from exercising the
right of stoppage. Such an agreement was attempted to be
shown by the trustee of the bankrupt. It appeared in evidence
that upon the arrival of the lumber notice of the same was given
the consignee by the railroad company. In addition, the postal
card contained the following: "If not unloaded within ninetysix hours . . . the freight will be subject to storage charges,
as per rules of the Massachusetts and New Hampshire Car
Service Association." The consignee testified that within a
few days after receiving this postal card, he telephoned the railroad company to store the lumber, but upon cross-examination
was unable to say what answer he had received. This testimony
was contradicted by the freight agent of the defendant company,
who testified "that he remembered the car of lumber, and stored
it in the ordinary course of business; and that he received no
directions from any one to store it."
As the case was tried without a jury, the finding of fact upon
this point devolved upon the judge below, and such finding
could not be reviewed by the court above. If then the court
found that no order to store was given the railroad company
by the consignee, no error was committed in refusing to rule,
as requested by the defendant, "that the plaintiff had lost the
right of stoppage in transitu, or had not seasonably exercised
that right."
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The ruling of the court below on this point was as follows:
"The storage of the lumber in question by the defendant, whether
according to the custom of storing after the expiration of the
limit of time set forth in the notice given by the defendant to
the consignee, or in accordance with the notice to store given
by the consignee, does not terminate the transit, without evidence of the attornnent by the defendant to the consignee, or
an agreement to hold as agent of the consignee."
This ruling of view of authority, appears to be correct. Even
supposing the railroad company had received the consignee's
message to store the lumber, no agency could be proved without
showing an agreement on the part of the carrier to such. This
is because the consignee cannot make the carrier his agent without the carrier's consent. The postal card sent the consignee
by the railroad company cannot be construed as an offer to store
the lumber as his agent, which offer was accepted by his telephonic message. It was merely a statement by the carrier of
its legal rights, and not an offer to enter into a new relation.
This becomes clearer when we consider that in Massachusetts
the carrier's lien does include charges for storage: Miller v.
Mansfield, 112 Mass. 260; Barker v. Brown, 138 Mass. 340.
Hence, there was no agreement on the part of the railroad
company to store the lumber as agent of the consignee; such
obligation could not be thrust upon it without its consent; and
in the absence of proof of such agreement the presumption that
the carrier continued to hold the goods by virtue of its lien
rmained unrebutted.
D.H.Y.

